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Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs1 
 
There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we 
believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who 
failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically 
incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one’s own beliefs need not expose 
one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge 
principle between first-order and second-order beliefs. This makes it possible for a 
subject to use probabilistic decision theory to manage in a rational way cases of 
potential failure of this self-knowledge, as we find in implicit bias. Through such cases I 
argue that it is possible for uncertainty about what our beliefs are to be not only 
rationally permissible but advantageous. 
 
 
Must we have more or less accurate beliefs about our beliefs? Many otherwise diverse 
thinkers have taken this to be a requirement for rational beings (E.g., Brandom (1994, 2000), 
Davidson (1984), Moran (2001), Savage (1972), Sellars (1963), Shoemaker (1994, 1996), 
Williams (2004)). In the tradition that defines rationality by means of the axioms of probability 
the reason for this view is arguments to the effect that a subject who either failed to be certain 
that he had a degree of belief he did have, or failed to have a degree of belief he was certain 
he had, would be vulnerable to sure loss. That is, there is a set of bets that such a subject 
would accept as fair and that would give him a loss no matter how the events he bet on turned 
out. This kind of vulnerability, which the word “incoherence”2 will refer to here, is according to 
this tradition what rationality protects us from. I will argue here that contrary to two 
entrenched arguments for this view sure loss does not follow from failure to have accurate 
beliefs about our own beliefs. Mistaken belief about one’s own belief is a failure, but it is a lack 
                                                             
1 Thanks to audiences at Carnegie Mellon University, the Rutgers Epistemology Conference, the Berkeley-London 
Graduate Philosophy Conference, the London School of Economics, and King’s College London for helpful criticism 
and discussion. Thanks in particular to Teddy Seidenfeld, Glen Shafer, Philip Dawid, Nick Shea, and Matt Parrott. 
2 Usage of this word varies between vulnerability to sure loss and violation of the axioms, two concepts that are 
largely extensionally equivalent but that can come apart depending on how sure loss is defined. One can violate 
the axioms and, arguably, not have the relevant vulnerability (Hacking 1967), and here the issue will be whether 
having not violated the axioms you can be vulnerable to sure loss by not having your higher- and lower- order 
beliefs in sync. 
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of knowledge and not a failure of rationality in the sense expressed by the probability axioms. 
If a rational being needs reasonably good knowledge of her own beliefs, we will need more 
than the constraint of probabilistic coherence to explain why.  
Perfect knowledge of our beliefs is one way of achieving coherence when we have higher- and 
lower-order beliefs, but that by itself gives us no guidance about how to minimize the damage 
if we are not perfect. One might think that of all frameworks the probabilistic system should be 
able to tell us how to manage this situation because it is designed to tell us how to be rational 
in circumstances of incomplete information and uncertainty. But if probabilistic rationality 
requires perfect knowledge of our beliefs then there is no rational way to manage violation of 
the requirement. Thus in arguing that coherence does not require self-knowledge of belief, I 
make room for the welcome possibility that probabilistic decision theory can be brought to 
bear for weighing our options in light of possible ignorance of our beliefs. My arguments show 
more specifically how to use that framework, by identifying a bridge principle between higher- 
and lower-order beliefs, which I call “No Gratuitous Interference” (NGI), the following of which 
completely protects a subject against sure loss if she does have inaccurate beliefs about her 
beliefs, and thus preserves rationality in the sense discussed here. The standard bridge 
principle on this topic, known as “Self-Respect” (SR), protects those with perfect self-
knowledge but does not protect the imperfect. Since NGI is a generalization of SR, this new 
principle is suitable for angels as well as humans, and advisable for those who do not know 
which they are. We will see further that uncertainty about what our beliefs are is not only 
rationally permissible, but also can be advantageous, as for example in cases of potential 
implicit bias. 
 
1. Is ignorance of our belief states even possible? 
It might seem as if there should be no dispute over the claim that we are sometimes wrong, or 
can be wrong, about what we believe or how strongly we believe it. Like the number of pigs in 
Allegheny County, that I have a particular degree of belief in a proposition is a state of the 
world and a contingent fact. It could have been otherwise than it is, and surely could be 
otherwise for all I know. The mere fact that I possess the belief does not automatically give me 
knowledge of it. It does not follow from my possessing a book that I know that I possess that 
book. If it did then I would either have a much more powerful mind or a much smaller storage 
unit than I do. I might clearly remember being tempted to buy that book, but not now be sure 
whether I did or not. I might clearly remember owning that book at one time, but be unable to 
remember whether I gave it away in the meantime. What is special about the case of belief 
that makes many people think that if I own a belief I must know that I own it? 
The answer may be that there is something special about minds. To extend the book 
metaphor, it is rather as if, like a person who can’t afford the local real estate, the mind lives in 
its storage unit with all of the boxes open. If a mind wants to know what beliefs it possesses it 
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has only to turn the light on and rummage around a little. Thus some say that while being 
wrong about past or future beliefs makes sense, in the same way that being wrong about other 
peoples’ beliefs makes sense, surely I here now could not be wrong about what I here now 
believe, at least not if I have a mind. I cannot directly see what books or beliefs were here 
yesterday, though I might know by some other means, but I can see what books and beliefs are 
and are not here right now. If it is not immediately obvious then I can just ask myself, and dig 
around a bit.  
You could ask yourself, and your answer could be wrong. Empirical psychology supports the 
common impression that we know our current mental states better than our past ones, and in 
many cases know our own mental states better than those of others, and we obviously do 
know quite enough about our current mental states to get around in the world in daily life, 
making plans on the basis of expectations about our behavior that depend on our own current 
beliefs and desires. However, we also have dark corners. Even we who do not regard ourselves 
as racist or sexist, who would never assent to the claim that minorities or women are by that 
fact less qualified, can be exposed through experiments to have implicit bias, for example 
through our overchoosing some job candidates’ resumes over others with no distinction in the 
profiles except racial association of the name. (Bertrand et al., 2004)  
If willingness to act on p is any part of what it is to believe p, which I think it is, then such 
studies give evidence that we were wrong when we claimed we did not have racist beliefs. It is 
not that a past self – the one who disavowed racism – was wrong about what a later self – the 
one undergoing the psychology experiment – believed. There is no reason to suppose the 
belief changed over that time. It merely took time to collect evidence about what was a stable 
disposition throughout the story. Thus, one surely can be mistaken about one’s current beliefs, 
and there can be evidence of it. If the mind were to be master of its own house, its house 
would have to be as small, inert, and indifferent as a storage unit, and, for good and ill, most 
minds do not meet these criteria.3  
If it is conceptually possible to be wrong about one’s own belief states then we should not take 
sincere assertion of p as a perfect indicator that one believes p, but we do not. This is easy to 
see through familiar scenarios that end with the statement “You don’t really believe that.” 
Imagine a man charged with racketeering, and guilty of it, who has nevertheless successfully 
avoided his wife ever witnessing anything illegal. Under interrogation the wife quite correctly 
asserts that she has never seen anything out of order, and quite sincerely asserts that her 
husband is just a businessman. The astute detective smells weakness, though, stares into her 
eyes, and says of her summary statement “You don’t really believe that, do you?” She does not 
want to believe that something is wrong, and does not have evidence that she can specify for 
                                                             
3 The non-technical views cited above that take accurate beliefs about our beliefs as required for rationality can 
accommodate violations as pathologies. However, that interpretation becomes strained in the case of implicit bias 
because if what empirical psychology suggests is right then bias in our judgment is pervasive across both subject 
matters and people. Thus, although morally problematic it would be statistically normal. 
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believing something is wrong, which together explain her sincere assertion. But she also does 
not – “deep down” we say – actually believe her husband is just a businessman. Things make 
her suspect otherwise though she cannot put her finger on why. It may be that all cases of 
sincere assertion without belief involve self-deception, but that would not support an 
argument that they are impossible. 
Whether it is possible to be wrong about one’s belief states depends of course on what beliefs 
are. If degree of belief in q is strength of a feeling one has about q, then that would set us up to 
know what our degrees of belief are, provided feelings are introspectable. Historically, some 
have thought that looking inward on oneself was not only a source of knowledge but even 
infallible, but we do not need to assume infallibility in order to understand the logic of this 
view. The idea is that it is the mind that possesses the feeling, and surely to feel q is sufficient 
for feeling that one feels q. Maybe the second-order feeling is not precise, but how can a mind 
have a feeling it is not able to become aware of or sense? How could it have a feeling it could 
not feel? Here the intuition comes not so much from a picture of the mind as it did above, but 
from what feelings are supposed to be. Whatever they are, feelings, hence beliefs, are not like 
books. The mind does not know one of them by rummaging around and lighting on an object. 
This view would also explain the widespread impression that one has access to one’s own 
beliefs of a sort that others do not have, access that has a quality of immediacy. It is easy to 
see these claims supporting a picture in which having beliefs at all involves having accurate 
beliefs about those beliefs. How could there be a belief, that is, a feeling, there if the mind that 
has it did not sense it?  
Like many probabilists, I follow Frank Ramsey (Ramsey 1926, Armendt 2006) in rejecting the 
definition of a degree of belief as a feeling, because it is insufficient for acknowledging the 
causal efficacy that beliefs have on our behavior. Rather, it is part of what belief is that it 
disposes one to act. Indeed on the Ramsey view having a degree of belief in q is fully identified 
with being disposed to act as if q is true with a risk of gaining and losing things of value to one 
that is proportional to that degree; one is disposed to put something at stake on q vs. not-q. To 
discover what one’s degree of belief is in q by self-inspection would involve not asking oneself 
how lively q feels, nor asking whether one would sincerely assert q, but asking oneself to what 
extent one would be willing to act on one’s confidence in q.4  
But asking oneself questions, or verbal behavior generally, would not be the only way to 
investigate what one’s degree of belief is. More tangible behavior putting something at risk if q 
is false is another kind of evidence. No finite set of either kind of evidence will imply that one 
has a given degree of belief, since a disposition is a regularity of response toward all possible 
opportunities (that are relevant, or likely, or similar to the actual world, or some such 
                                                             
4 There are several kinds of attempted analyses of the notion of degree of belief appropriate for probability. 
These, including Ramsey’s, are outlined and their flaws discussed in Eriksson and Hajek (2007), who go on to 
argue convincingly both that flawed analyses can have explanatory value and that we have every right and reason 
to take the concept of degree of belief as an epistemological primitive. 
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qualifier), but if beliefs are dispositions to act then it is possible in any given case for evidence 
from tangible behavior to be a more reliable indication of one’s degrees of belief than 
evidence coming from conversations with oneself. This view of belief makes good sense of the 
impression that the experiments showing implicit bias are uncovering something about our 
beliefs. Whatever we may say about our beliefs, deciding among job candidates can be more 
revealing of those mental states because in such decisions we stand to benefit or lose a good 
bit depending on whether we are right or wrong about who is most competent. So we act on 
the basis of what we really think.5 
Though Leonard Savage also thought of degree of belief as a state of mind that manifested 
itself in extraverbal behavior, he regarded the answer the subject gives to the hypothetical 
question how he would bet or act as “just the right one” for “the theory’s more normative 
interpretation as a set of criteria for us to apply to our own decisions”. (Savage 1972, 27-30) 
This is to take it as a norm of rationality that your actual degree of belief (thus betting odds) 
coincide with what you think it is, and is partly based on the sure-loss arguments discussed 
below. But the view is not pertinent to the current discussion of whether being wrong about 
one’s degrees of belief is possible. Savage most definitely thought it was, and that since 
reports of how one would bet can differ from one’s actual dispositions to bet, the interrogation 
about hypothetical behavior was a compromise between economy and rigor on the empirical 
question what a subject’s degree of belief actually is. (Savage 1972, 27-30) 
Savage observed these distinctions but the normative claim that a subject should know what 
his beliefs are is often conflated with the descriptive claim that he always does via the 
metaphor of announcement of odds. This accounts for the frequent response on the part of 
probabilistically well-educated philosophers to the idea that we might not have perfect 
knowledge of our beliefs that begins with a blank stare and continues: You’ve just announced 
your odds! How could you not know what they are? First, having odds does not require 
announcing them, but second, in the context of odds, announcing is ambiguous between 
reporting and doing. It is verbal behavior, but the image suggests there is an audience ready to 
accept those bets. If so, then one who has posted odds is not merely reporting how he thinks 
he would bet; he is on the hook. But this identifies what we say about our beliefs with what is 
true of them only by equivocation. 
Even if announcement of odds compels actual betting, and even though actual betting is often 
better evidence for one’s disposition to bet than merely telling yourself how you would bet, 
being on the hook on an occasion is not the very same thing as your disposition to bet. You 
might have made an announcement incompetently relative to your dispositions by making a 
                                                             
5 Verbal behavior is of course also action; it can put valuable things at risk, even tangible things, and that positive 
or negative utility figures in the calculation of the most advantageous behavior overall. Being taken by others as 
unbiased on the basis of one’s testimony to that effect will often have positive utility and if that utility has a 
greater absolute value for the subject than the negative utility of not hiring the most competent person, then 
implicit, that is, disavowed, bias, could be advantageous overall. 
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mistake in the math associated with the stakes in a particular game, or accidentally before you 
had finished the math. Your actual betting behavior arises out of your dispositions to bet, in 
conjunction with circumstances and opportunities, but it is not the same thing. 
Once we have the idea of a degree of belief as a disposition to act, the possibility of being 
wrong about our beliefs is easy to comprehend. If it is hard to imagine a belief whose owner 
does not believe he has it, it is not hard to imagine a disposition to act that a person does not 
believe he has. More than once in human history a sincere belief that “I would never do that” 
has been followed sooner or later by the person doing just that. In some cases the disposition 
will have changed in the meantime between report and act, but it need not; it is enough if the 
conditions changed in such a way to activate an existing disposition unknown to the subject. 
We can imagine others having been in a position to predict the behavior the subject did not 
expect of himself. As a disposition to act, a belief becomes more analogous to an intention. We 
seem to find it easy to see when others are not aware of their real intentions, and we have 
probably all been in situations where it was natural to speak of not knowing whether our own 
intentions were good. 
The Ramsey view makes it natural to classify implicit bias as a case of (degree of) belief, 
because what makes a belief a belief on this view is its potential to affect the subject’s actions, 
and the view has no requirement that she have conscious access to or voluntary control over 
this disposition. A person who believes she does not have racist beliefs would naturally tend 
also to believe that she would never disadvantage a minority in her decision-making during 
hiring. On the Ramseyan view, if she is wrong about her disposition to act – as the empirical 
evidence suggests most of us are – then she is wrong about her belief. There is a tendency in 
the literature to identify implicit bias as alief (Gendler 2008), an automatic or habitual belief-
like attitude, particularly one disconsonant with one’s explicit avowals, but on this definition of 
alief there is no inconsistency in classifying it also as a Ramseyan belief, because the latter view 
has no requirement that the disposition to act be responsive to reasons or easily changed.6 
This is important because it allows for the possibility of using probabilistic decision theory to 
manage the difficult situation implicit bias puts us in. In that framework probabilities are 
beliefs, so if an alief is not a belief then the framework is not available for those cases.7   
For Ramsey the picture of a bettor and a bookie looking to score was merely a colorful 
metaphor. Empirical evidence of one’s dispositions to act can come from any action. The 
usefulness of the metaphor comes from the fact that every action in which something is at 
                                                             
6 Some cases of alief will qualify as incoherent when described as Ramseyan degrees of belief. If for example you 
are willing to bet the same amount of money on each of two glasses you have seen be filled with sugar and water, 
on their being safe to drink, but are reluctant to drink one of the glasses, and not the other, because of a label 
“sodium cyanide” that you affixed to it yourself, then you are disposed to bet with two different sets of odds on 
the same proposition. But it does not seem inappropriate to classify such an alief as irrational. 
7 A sticking point in representing an alief as a belief will be whether the state is an attitude toward a specific 
propositional content or its intentionality is more diffusely distributed. I tend to agree with Mandelbaum (2013) 
that the state must have propositional content if it is to do the explanatory work that has been expected of it. 
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stake can be represented as a gamble. In crossing streets I bet my life that cars cannot move at 
the speed of light, and, more mundanely, that I’ve looked in the right direction for the country 
I’m in. These kinds of bets are made without announcements or reports, but we still stand to 
gain or lose depending on our actions.8 Thus even though not all dispositions to act are 
dispositions to lay down money with a bookie, we can imagine them as dispositions to bet, and 
thereby imagine behavioral evidence about a subject’s degree of belief in q taking the form of 
actual betting on q. This simplifies the theoretical discussion, and the quantitative 
representation is an efficient way to make qualitative comparisons. A bet at odds of x: 1-x on q 
would be taken as evidence that the subject has odds of x:1-x, that is, degree of belief x in q.  
In the subjective probabilistic view of rationality, rational degrees of belief obey the probability 
axioms, so the fact that such a subject has degree of belief x in q is expressed by “P(q) = x” 
where P is the subject’s personal probability function P. These probabilities are possessions of 
the subject, hence are called “subjective”, but an internalist picture is not mandated by this 
use of probability if we adopt the Ramseyan view of belief. As noted above, a subject may or 
may not have introspective access to what a given degree of belief of hers is because it is 
possible to have difficulty becoming aware of one’s own dispositions to act. A non-extreme 
degree of belief expresses uncertainty without the subject needing an attitude at all about 
what her uncertainty is. She may or may not have second-order degrees of belief expressing 
claims about the first-order degrees of belief, but if she does she need not have introspective 
access to them either. Notably, she can and standardly does show her appreciation that one 
claim, q, supports another, p, by revising her degree of belief in p accordingly (e.g., by 
conditionalization), and without beliefs about that support relation or about her beliefs.9 In 
this the framework stands in marked contrast to philosophers who argue for metaknowledge 
of our beliefs on the basis of a claim that rational belief revision requires us to have knowledge 
of our beliefs (e.g., Davidson 1984, Williams 2004: 208, Shoemaker 1994: 281-286, 1996: 33-
34). 
In fact many of the founding fathers of the probabilistic rationality view were quite opposed to 
the intrusion of higher-order probabilities or beliefs. These were perceived to be 
philosophically suspect and mathematical trouble, and it is unclear which was the cart and 
                                                             
8 Some resist the betting interpretation of these acts, with the idea that it would be crazy to bet one’s life on an 
empirical proposition. In fact we do it every day, and we are startled at the idea because we normally suppress 
awareness of it, in the way a person who re-locates to an earthquake-prone area and worries about it eventually 
stops thinking about the risk. Once awareness arises it is common to either suppress it again or else realize that 
this kind of bet is not taken in isolation. If I never bet my life on matters like cars not traveling the speed of light, I 
would never cross the street or go anywhere at all. For most people that would not be a life worth having, so the 
beliefs and utilities are in balance. 
9 Dispositions corresponding to a conditional probability are needed in order for the subject to carry out 
conditionalization, but those do not amount to beliefs about the support relation. First, a conditional probability is 
not the probability of a conditional (Lewis 1976), and second, in the standard axiomatization conditional 
probabilities are equal to ratios of unconditional probabilities and are not some further thing beyond these parts. 
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which was the horse in their arguments.10 Whether higher-order probabilities are legitimate or 
need to be reigned in, there is no difficulty representing them since the claim that the value of 
a probability function is x is itself a proposition and so can fall within the domain of one or 
more probability functions. Thus, if a rational subject does have a degree of belief about her 
own first-order degree of belief, then her second-order degree of belief y in her having first-
order degree of belief x in q can be expressed by a second-order probability: P(P(q)=x) = y. She 
has degree of belief y that she has degree of belief x in q.  
For the question of this paper we need to imagine behavioral betting evidence of the subject’s 
degree of belief about her degree of belief in q, but it is easy to see what form this must take. 
Evidence of her degree of belief about her degree of belief in q would take the form of her bets 
concerning how she would bet on q. The conceptual possibility of being wrong about one’s 
own degrees of belief is thus secured by the fact that she could lose the bet about how she 
would bet on q, by betting differently on q than she bet that she would. 
One might think that this possibility is idle since there would be no way to settle the bet she 
made about how she would bet on q. The only behavioral way to investigate whether she was 
right about this would be to ask her to bet on q, and this behavior would not be probative 
because we could not rule out the possibility that this second bet was strategic. She might 
have bet what she did on q just in order to win her previous bet on what she would bet on q. If 
she were smart wouldn’t she always do that?  
We cannot expect the evidence for our dispositions (degrees of belief) to be infallible whether 
it comes from behavioral manifestations or introspective conversations. However, we can take 
steps to address the possibility of strategic betting in the operational procedure described for 
verification. We can make the reward for getting it right about q much higher than the reward 
for getting it right about the way she would bet about q, and the reward for the latter small. 
This reward structure gives her the incentive to bet at the first-order, that is, on q, in accord 
with the degree of belief she really has in q. (Skyrms 1980) Since she got no new evidence 
about q between the two bets, we can assume that the degree of belief she manifests in the 
second bet is also the one she had when she bet about what her degree of belief in q was. 
How can the Ramseyan picture explain the impression that our knowledge of our own beliefs is 
better and more immediate than our knowledge of others’ beliefs or their knowledge of ours? 
Introspection is immediate in some sense and can only be done on oneself, so the existence of 
such an ability would explain the intuitions of asymmetry between the types of access the 1st 
and 3rd person have to information about belief states. This asymmetry of access could also 
provide some explanation of why we typically know more about our own beliefs than others 
do.  
                                                             
10 See Skyrms (1980) for a survey of and response to their objections. 
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The Ramseyan view does not require introspective access but the existence of introspective 
evidence for belief is not incompatible with the view that belief is a disposition to act. What 
would be incompatible is a claim that introspection and sincere assertion are the only kinds of 
evidence. The Ramseyan view of belief gives the means to tell a fuller story. It is possible that 
at least some of our knowledge of our own mental states, including our dispositions to act, is 
gained in the same manner as our knowledge of others’ mental states – via behavioral data, 
our observations of our own actions. This view is supported by a good deal of current cognitive 
science (Carruthers 2011), and the view that this is our primary way of knowing our own minds 
goes back at least as far as Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1949: 155-6).  
Whenever we do use behavioral evidence to know our own minds, an asymmetry in our 
knowledge of beliefs is introduced by the fact that in our own case we have a lot more 
empirical evidence. With the exception of conjoined twins, a human being spends more time in 
her own company than she does with any other individual. She thus has anywhere from more 
to vastly more behavioral evidence about herself than about any other individual, and than any 
other individual has about her. The felt immediacy of our knowledge of our mental states, 
when that feeling exists, might come from the fact that we do not need to be consciously 
thinking about our behavior in order to be registering or processing information about it, and 
that at any given time most of our behavioral evidence about ourselves will already have been 
processed, and our conclusions ready to hand or even entrenched. Thus Ramsey’s view of 
belief allows us to add a type of evidence that we might have about our beliefs, and that might 
even contribute to explaining 1st- and 3rd-person asymmetry, without requiring us to deny that 
there is introspective evidence.  
Just as the possibility of self-deception does not imply that we are pervasively self-deceived, 
the possibility of inaccurate beliefs about one’s beliefs does not imply that we are typically, 
grossly, or pervasively wrong about them. We are evidently not, as noted above, since we 
effectively anticipate and plan many of our actions. The upshot of the conceptual possibility of 
error about some of our beliefs is support for the view that our accuracy about our beliefs in 
ordinary contexts is a contingent fact, not a necessary consequence of having beliefs at all. 
 
2. Is Ignorance of one’s own belief states compatible with rationality? The Direct Argument 
To admit that blindness about some of our beliefs is conceptually and psychologically possible, 
is not to concede that such ignorance is compatible with being a rational subject, and the latter 
is usually the point at issue when the possibility of self-blindness about one’s beliefs is denied. I 
will focus here on a way of asserting this claim in probabilistic terms, and two ways of 
defending the claim that get little discussion in print because they are widely taken to be a 
settled matter, obvious to anyone sufficiently trained to follow a two-step and a four-step 
argument about betting. I will argue that both of these arguments are invalid, and propose an 
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alternative, systematic, way of handling uncertain and not fully accurate beliefs about our 
beliefs that avoids sure loss and has recognizable and compelling intuitive interpretations. 
The natural way for a probabilist to define knowledge of one’s own belief states is through the 
following conditions: 
For every q for which the subject has some level of credence x,  
either P(P(q) = x) = 1 or P(P(q) = x) = 0  and  Confidence 
if P(P(q) = x) = 1 then P(q) = x,  Accuracy 
Confidence says that if one has some degree of belief x in q, then one is certain that one’s 
degree of belief in q is x or certain that it isn’t. Accuracy says that if one is certain that one’s 
degree of belief in q is x then indeed it is x. I will call these two conditions together “Self-
Transparency” (ST).11, 12, 13 
Soshichi Uchii (1973) argued that addition of these conditions to the probability axioms yields 
the natural extension of the probabilistic conception of rationality to the second-order, that is, 
to degrees of belief about degrees of belief, or probabilities of probabilities, via a sure-loss 
argument that is repeated regularly and reflexively today.  
To show vulnerability to sure loss we must show that there is a set of bets that the subject 
regards as fair and that would give her a loss no matter how the questions she bet on turned 
out. In the sure-loss argument for ST we have a subject whose probability function is P, and 
who has degree of belief x in q. The statement that she has this degree of belief, P(q) = x, is the 
proposition we imagine her betting on, call it B. That is, we imagine her having a degree of 
                                                             
11 This is a minimal property of knowledge, in which the subject’s degrees of belief merely correspond to the facts. 
It lacks the additional robustness that epistemologists generally recognize as necessary for knowledge, which 
might come from justifiedness, or reliability, or tracking, or virtue. The minimal notion is sufficient for the purpose 
here, since if having this property toward one’s degrees of belief is not necessary for rationality then a strictly 
stronger property is not either. 
12 In these stipulations knowledge of one’s beliefs is defined as infallible and perfectly precise, but in rejecting ST, 
infallibility and over-precision are not my targets. (Cf. Williamson 2000.) Using the new principle introduced 
below, NGI, a subject can protect herself from sure loss no matter the level of inaccuracy she has about her 
beliefs. The point here is not that she be allowed imprecision, but that failure to know what her beliefs are is not 
per se a failure that compromises her rationality. I address the perfect properties because the sure loss argument 
looks strong enough to defend even them. 
13 One could define self-knowledge using two different probability functions, instead of one function applied to 
itself as in ST. One of the two functions would play the higher-order role, the other representing degrees of belief 
at the first order. However, that might be similar enough to one subject having degrees of belief about another 
subject’s degrees of belief that inaccuracies would escape incoherence in a similar way; there does not seem to be 
any intuitive reason to think that being mistaken about someone else’s beliefs makes us irrational. I use one 
probability function applied to itself because this is prima facie the most likely to produce incoherence when 
there is any misalignment between the two orders. For some problems and solutions for self-referential 
probability functions see Caie (2013), and Campbell-Moore (2015a, 2015b). 
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belief, z, about whether x is her degree of belief in q, and z is her probability for the 
proposition P(q) = x; we write this statement P(P(q) = x) = z, and now P(B) = z. With stake S, her 
gains when B is true and false are: 
 B true   B false 
 S - z∙S   - z∙S  
One way for the subject to violate self-transparency is for P(q) = x to be true while she is not 
certain of it. That is, z < 1 and B is true. Now suppose the stake is -1. Her net gain if B is true is S 
- z∙S, which is -1 + z < 0. Her net gain if B is false is z > 0. But B is not going to be false because it 
is a statement of this subject’s degree of belief in q and that is x by assumption. Thus, the 
subject whose probability function is P does not have a chance at the gain in the column where 
B is false. If the stake on the bet on P(q) = x is negative, then the subject for whom P(q) = r but 
who is uncertain that P(q) = r is sure to suffer a loss of x - 1.  
The other way for the subject to violate ST is for her to be certain that P(q) is x when it is not. 
I.e., z = 1 and B is false. In this case, take a positive stake, S = 1. If B is true, then she has a gain 
of 1 – z = 0, and if B is false then she has a loss of z. But this subject’s degrees of belief about q 
insure that B is false, so she can only lose. This subject is sure to suffer a loss of z. 
This argument shows that for a subject with probability function P who violates Self-
Transparency there is a set of bets that she would accept that would give her a loss in all 
possible worlds in which her probability function is P. It is a result that should come as no 
surprise, since restricting the set of worlds of evaluation to those in which she has this 
probability function is effectively treating the fact that she has these degrees of belief as a 
necessary truth. A subject will be susceptible to sure loss if she bets even a penny against a 
necessary truth. 
As I have stressed, that a subject has a particular degree of belief is a contingent truth. Two 
plus two could not have been five, but our subject’s degree of belief in q could have been 
different than it actually is, and, as we implicitly grant by imagining this betting scenario, it 
could actually be different from x for all she knows. The fact that what her degree of belief is in 
q is settled at the stage of our betting scenario does not change this. Even if a coin is already 
tossed, it is still sensible to bet on two possible outcomes, as long as the result of the toss 
remains concealed.14 The fact that we the theorists may legitimately assume we know what 
the subject’s probability function is does not imply that the subject knows. One way to justify 
the claim that the subject knows what her probability function is would be to assume that she 
must know in order to be a rational subject at all, but of course that would be begging the 
question at issue here. 
                                                             
14 Thanks to Joe Ramsey for suggesting this comparison.  
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Substituting a concealed coin toss for her degree of belief in the sure-loss argument above 
brings out the invalidity of that argument. In the substitution the analog to her having degree 
of belief x in q is the coin coming up, say, heads, H, and the analogs of violating Self-
Transparency are being uncertain that the coin came up heads when it did, and being certain 
that it came up heads when it did not, i.e., the two ways of being most extremely wrong about 
H. If we assume that the coin indeed came up heads, H, and that this has been concealed from 
the subject, and as above that her probability function is P, the sure-loss argument above 
becomes: 
One way for the subject to be wrong about whether it came up heads is for H to be true 
while she is not certain of it. That is, z < 1 and H is true. Now suppose the stake is -1. 
Her net gain if H is true is S - z∙S, which is -1 + z < 0. Her net gain if H is false is z > 0. But 
H is not going to be false because it is a statement of the outcome of the coin toss, and 
that is H by assumption. Thus, the subject whose probability function is P does not have 
a chance at the gain in the column where H is false. If the stake on the bet on H is 
negative, then the subject for whom H is true but who is uncertain that H is sure to 
suffer a loss z – 1. 
Necessarily, if an outcome is settled, then a subject who bet anything against that outcome will 
lose something, but vulnerability to sure loss requires the existence of a set of stakes that will 
make you lose in all possible outcomes. If you have a false belief about the outcome of the coin 
toss, a bookie who knows the outcome of the toss could exploit your ignorance for his gain, 
but this loss is due to a lack of knowledge, not a failure of rationality, on your part. 
To establish a sure-loss vulnerability in the foregoing way in a subject who is not Self-
Transparent, it has to be not just true that P(q) = x, but true in all possible worlds relevant to 
the evaluation. P(q) = x is a contingent matter, so, like H, its actually being true does not imply 
there are no possible worlds in which it is false. Why did we only count as relevant those 
worlds in which P(q) = x is true? It is standard procedure when evaluating the subject’s fate in 
betting that one only evaluates worlds in which she has the degrees of belief, i.e., probability 
function, that she actually has. Here the subject actually has degree of belief x in q, so we take 
it she has this in every world relevant to the evaluation. The reason for this procedure is that 
her probability function determines the odds she is willing to accept, and we are trying to 
determine what fate those dispositions to bet will bring her, not what would happen if she had 
some other dispositions.  
However, this rationale for the standard procedure supports a different procedure in the 
second-order case. The set of relevant possible worlds should indeed be ones where she has 
the odds she uses in the actual world for the questions she is betting on. When she bets on q, 
the odds she is willing to accept are determined by the value of P(q), but when she bets on 
whether or not P(q) = x, her odds are determined by a different part of the function P, namely, 
by the value of P(P(q) = x). The rationale that tells us that when she bets on q we should 
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consider only worlds in which P(q) = x implies that when she bets on P(q) = x we should 
consider only worlds in which P(P(q) = x) equals its actual value, but it gives no reason to 
restrict the outcome-worlds for the second-order bet to those worlds in which P(q) = x.  
Indeed, if we do hold P(q) = x fixed, that is, true in all worlds relevant to the evaluation, when 
we evaluate how the subject fares in betting on P(q) = x, we are not treating P(q) = x as an 
outcome or random variable, a proposition for which more than one value is possible, in this 
case the values true and false. If so, then we are not treating it as something that could be bet 
on, so the Uchii argument is not a betting argument, not a sure-loss argument for Self-
Transparency, at all.  
In the subjective interpretation of probability, that P(q) = x is a random variable is equivalent to 
its being possible that the subject does not know whether her degree of belief in q is x. A 
random variable can be thought of as a proposition whose probability value is subject to 
variations due to randomness. What this randomness consists in depends on the interpretation 
of probability. For example, if one has a propensity interpretation, then the randomness is the 
chance involved in the set-up for an experiment, e.g. with dice. On the subjective 
interpretation of probability, it is the subjective randomness that results from incomplete 
knowledge of a quantity; it is epistemic uncertainty. There is no question that in the current 
context we are using a subjective interpretation, and therefore allowing or denying that P(H) = 
x is a random variable is equivalent to allowing or denying it as possible that the subject does 
not know the outcome, here does not know what her belief is. In not treating P(H) = x as a 
random variable, the Direct Argument begs the question. 
In treating worlds in which the subject has a different degree of belief from her actual one as 
irrelevant, the Direct Argument is either inconsistent with the subjective interpretation of 
probability – because it is assuming that epistemic uncertainty is not sufficient to make a 
variable random – or else it is begging the question of whether the subject could be rational 
without knowing what her beliefs are – by assuming the subject has no uncertainty or error 
about what her degree of belief is. 
One might try replacing the Direct Argument with a denial that P(q) = x could even be an 
outcome or random variable, but one would need an argument for this that addresses the fact 
that whether one has a particular degree of belief or not is a contingent matter. Sure loss 
arguments can be made against a subject who fails to be certain of logical truths or who is 
willing to stake something on a logical falsehood, but what justifies this is that the content of 
the proposition is a necessary truth.15 No possible world in which the necessary truth is false is 
                                                             
15 Even this is dubious since the randomness of a random variable in the subjective interpretation is supposed to 
be epistemic uncertainty, and propositions whose content is logically necessary can still be epistemically 
uncertain. The probabilistic conception of rationality is prima facie limited to requiring logical omniscience, a 
problem beyond the scope of this paper.  
   
14 
 
relevant because none exist. Since there are possible worlds in which the subject has a 
different degree of belief than the one she actually has, the burden is on one arguing for Self-
Transparency to explain why we should treat her having a given degree of belief as necessary. 
It is a necessary truth relative to the subject’s probability function, but resting an argument on 
that buys nothing. Her probability function as a whole could also have been otherwise. 
Holding P(q) fixed when evaluating the subject’s bet on q, and letting it vary when she is 
betting on the proposition P(q) = x will be enforced simply by treating the bets on q and the 
bets on P(q) = x as having different sets of relevant possible worlds. Evaluating the first-order 
and second-order parts of the subject’s probability function thus differently may seem suspect 
since in evaluating coherence we want to know whether a person’s degrees of belief fit 
together properly, and surely coherence of a whole function cannot be evaluated a piece at a 
time.  
It is true that evaluating the coherence of a proper subset of a particular subject’s degrees of 
belief is not enough to conclude that the subject is coherent, and evaluating each of an 
exhaustive set of subsets will not address whether they are coherent with each other. 
However, these are not what we are doing. Our question here is whether failure of 
transparency at the second-order about one’s beliefs at the first order introduces incoherence, 
so we are entitled to assume that the first-order degrees of belief of the subject are coherent. 
In fact we must assume the subject is coherent at the first order in order to isolate our 
question. If we can see that inaccurate or uncertain second-order degrees of belief do not 
necessarily introduce incoherence into an otherwise coherent subject, then we will have 
certified the possibility of coherence of such a subject’s entire set of probabilities, not just a 
subset of them, and not just subsets of them piecemeal but as a whole.  
With this understanding, we are imagining a subject betting with the second-order part of her 
function on what the values of the first-order part of her function are, with the assumption 
that the first-order part of her function is coherent, but no further assumptions about the 
particular values its arguments take. She fails Self-Transparency if she lacks Confidence or 
Accuracy about even one of her degrees of belief, that is, about propositions of the form P(q) = 
x. We ask whether a failure of this sort yields a sure loss. The sure loss argument above fails, 
for the same reason that taking its analog in the concealed coin toss situation as a sure loss 
would be a misinterpretation. If, in the first way of failing Self-Transparency, P(q) = x is true but 
P(P(q) = x) ≠1, then a negative stake is the only way to argue for a sure loss, but it does not 
yield a sure loss. In one of the possible outcomes, namely where P(q) ≠ x, the subject gains z > 
0. If her bet against P(q) = x corresponded to a degree of belief in P(q) ≠ x that was greater than 
0, then she wins something. That non-actual world in which P(q) ≠ x and she wins something 
for betting even a penny in its favor is among the possible worlds relevant to the evaluation. 
An analogous point holds for the failure of Accuracy. 
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The view I am advocating has a number of virtues. Intuitively, the difference between the 
Direct Argument and the correction I am proposing is that the former is posed from the 
theorist’s point of view, whereas I set up the betting from the point of view of the subject. The 
latter, but not the former, is in keeping with the subjective interpretation of probability, as 
noted previously concerning random variables, and with the whole point of the conception of 
rationality based on subjective probability, that the subject not be judged on the basis of 
whether her contingent beliefs are true or probable. This is why it makes sense at all for her to 
be judged not on whether she loses in the actual world, but whether she could lose in all 
possible worlds. When we judge her by coherence we find that the subject will actually lose, 
other things equal, if she does not know what her degrees of belief are, but she will not 
necessarily lose. This distinction may seem idle, but we will see below that it is not if her 
questions about what to believe about her beliefs are embedded in a larger context of 
questions she faces.  
3. Self-Transparency and Self-Respect: The Indirect Argument 
Though the direct sure-loss argument for Self-Transparency fails, there is a bridge principle 
that immediately implies the Accuracy direction of ST, and for which a sure-loss argument has 
also been proposed. This is 
P(q/P(q) = x) = x  Self-Respect (SR) 
called “Self-Respect” by David Christensen (2007), and a two-function version of which was 
dubbed “Miller’s Principle” by Brian Skyrms (1980). I will sometimes refer to this as the “10th-
Character Principle” since it requires on the right hand side a re-inscription of whatever is in 
the 10th-character position, counting from the left, an answer that the subject can give without 
first investigating how the world is. SR says that your degree of belief in H given that your 
degree of belief in H is x, should be x. We could paraphrase it: that your degree of belief is x is 
not a reason for it to be some other value.  
SR is not trivially true. For example it does not say that if your degree of belief in q is x then 
your degree of belief in q is x. It does not follow from the probability axioms alone because it is 
a bridge principle between the orders and the axioms are within-order constraints that only 
impose relations between orders at extreme probability values.  Notice also that SR does not 
mention or depend on what the subject’s degree of belief in q actually is. The conditional 
probability can be written out as a ratio: 
P(q/P(q) = x)    =    P(q.P(q) = x)|P(P(q)=x) 
in which the expression “P(q) = x” never occurs naked, but only as an argument of the function 
P. This means that the principle makes stipulations on the basis not of what your degree of 
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belief in q actually is but on what you think it is. It says that your supposing that your degree of 
belief in q is x does not give grounds for it to be some other value. 
Assuming coherence, SR implies the Accuracy condition above because  
P(P(q) = x)) = 1 and 
P(q/P(q) = x) = x  
together imply 
P(q) = x 
Confidence and Accuracy together imply SR, as shown by Sobel (1987, 69-70) and more simply 
by Christensen (2007, 325-6). Notably, SR alone does not imply Confidence.16 SR is the 
synchronic instance of Bas van Fraassen’s (1984) Reflection Principle, so Reflection 
presupposes and implies Accuracy about one’s current beliefs. The principle has been popular: 
Koons (1992, 23) takes a version of SR to be a ‘virtually undeniable principle … of rationality’, 
van Fraassen takes the synchronic instance of Reflection as “-- I should think, uncontroversial” 
(van Fraassen 1995, 19), and Vickers (2000, 160) refers to SR as “a well-known principle of 
epistemic logic”.  
SR or variations of it have played a key role in arguments illustrating the usefulness of second-
order probabilities, and the logically stronger ST has played that role in arguments urging their 
triviality. For example, a version of SR with different functions at the two orders allowed 
Skyrms to show that the content of what we learn in a Jeffrey conditionalization can be 
understood as a second-order disjunction of statements of the degrees of belief that changed 
in the learning, because second-order strict conditionalization on such a disjunction is 
equivalent to first-order Jeffrey conditionalization. Haim Gaifman used a two-function version 
of SR as an axiom to construct a theory of higher-order probability. (Gaifman 1986)  
On the other side, Self-Transparency makes all of the second-order unconditional probabilities 
equal to zero or one, thus making them irrelevant to every other proposition, and so, it is 
assumed, idle, unable to effect any changes in the probabilities of other propositions.17 ST is 
                                                             
16 Assume SR. Without loss of generality suppose that the only possible values for P(H) are x and y, and suppose 
P(H) = x. By total probability, P(H) = P(H/P(H)=x)P(P(H)=x) + P(H/P(H)=y)P(P(H)=y). Under our assumptions, it 
follows that x = xP(P(H)=x) + yP(P(H)=y); to preserve coherence it is sufficient that P(P(H)=y)|P(P(H)=x) = x|y. This 
means that the Indirect Argument for SR, even if successful, cannot serve as a full argument for ST. 
17 The Savage-Woodbury “collapse” argument (Savage 1972, 58-59 ) that since any statement of second-order 
probability can be reduced to a first-order statement it is thereby trivial or epiphenomenal, does not, or need not, 
assume SR. It depends only on the fact that total probability relates the first- and second-order thus: P(H) = 
P(H/P(H)=x)P(P(H)=x)) + P(H/P(H)≠x)P(P(H≠x)), which does not imply SR (or the weaker RSR defined below). The 
collapse argument does not assume or imply ST and is not intended to. Its target is the attempted use of higher-
order probability to represent imprecise credence. 
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thus a perfect shield from the perceived trouble of second-order probabilities since it 
acknowledges the existence of the application of functions to propositions about their values 
that is licensed by the probability representation, while (apparently) rendering any hierarchies 
thus expressed ineffectual and innocuous. Thus, whether we should take it as a requirement 
that the value of P(q/P(q) = x) be x, and if so why, is a matter of some interest independently of 
the question whether we must have knowledge of our beliefs in order to be rational. 
Skyrms seems to regard his version of Self-Respect as a useful idealization, having even 
provided a counterexample to it (Skyrms 1980, 125). While I think there can be no quarrel that 
various versions of this principle are valuable for simplifying a representation and isolating 
questions of interest, many have regarded SR as a requirement of rationality, on the basis of an 
argument that violating it makes a subject vulnerable to sure loss. If that argument succeeds 
then coherence implies SR, which implies Accuracy, so coherence requires Accuracy at least, 
but I will argue that the sure-loss argument fails.  
The substance of this sure loss argument has been discussed in illuminating ways and in 
different forms by Christensen 2007, and Briggs 2009, both of them pointing out ways in which 
the sure loss that is secured by it is weaker than the usual conclusion. I will go further to argue 
that there is a generalization of SR that avoids sure loss vulnerabilities entirely, even for the 
subject who fails Self-Transparency, even if the failure is extreme.  
Here I present the sure-loss argument in the style that followers of Savage will recognize. 
Taking 
H: The coin lands heads. 
G: P(H) = x 
we suppose that  
P(H/P(H)=x) = y for some y > x, 
that is, that the subject violates SR, and   
P(P(H)=x) = z > 0, 
that is, that the subject allows it as at least possible that the condition P(H) = x is fulfilled.18 
To represent a conditional probability in betting terms we use a called-off bet. For the 
conditional probability P(H/G), the bet concerning H will only be in force if G holds. If G does 
not hold then the bets involving H are off. In our case G is P(H) = x. That is, G is the claim that 
the subject’s degree of belief in H is x. The subject has odds on both H and P(H) = x, but the bet 
the conditional probability tells us he makes on H is called off if the other matter he has odds 
on, P(H) = x, turns out false. 
                                                             
18 I represent the subject’s beliefs as probabilities rather than merely as credences because I am assuming they 
conform to the axioms, and are coherent until some specific assumption about the subject makes them 
otherwise. 
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To see how the commitments expressed in our assumptions might turn out for the subject, we 
write a table with columns for all of the possible outcomes and with stakes, bn. H(ω) is 1 if H is 
true, and 0 if H is false, and similarly for G(ω), which is 1 if P(H) = x and 0 if P(H) ≠ x. 
Outcomes ---> H and G -H and G -G 
    
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – y) b1(1-y) -b1y 0 
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1-z) b2(1-z) -b2z 
Total each outcome    
There are only three columns because in case G is false the bet on the coin is called off, so it 
does not matter whether H is true or false. With the proposition P(H) = x represented as “G”, 
this looks like an ordinary situation. But here G is a statement of probability, hence a 
statement of the subject’s betting odds on H. This statement will be true in the first two sets of 
possible worlds, and in those worlds the odds G indicates will contribute to the subject’s wins 
and losses. In those worlds, in addition to being willing to bet at odds y:1-y on H, she is also 
willing to bet at odds x:1-x on H. That commitment must be listed in the table along with the 
other odds, yielding: 
 
Outcomes ---> H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x P(H) ≠ x 
b3(H(ω) – x) b3(1-x) -b3x    ------- 
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – y) b1(1-y) -b1y 0 
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1-z) b2(1-z) -b2z 
Total each outcome b3(1-x)+ b1(1-y)+ b2(1-z) -b3x+ -b1y+ b2(1-z) -b2z 
Accepting two different sets of odds on the same proposition can come to no good. Following 
Teddy Seidenfeld, who endorses this argument fully and thinks that Savage had it in mind as 
obvious, we can see the subject described by this table as vulnerable to loss in all possible 
outcome-worlds, if we assign values 1, (y-x)/2, and -1 to the stakes b1, b2, and b3 respectively. 
This gives a negative payoff in every column, as calculated in the final row below.  
Outcomes ---> H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x P(H) ≠ x 
b3(H(ω) – x) b3(1-x) -b3x    ------- 
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – y) b1(1-y) -b1y 0 
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1-z) b2(1-z) -b2z 
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Total each outcome x-y + (y-x)(1-z)/2 x-y+ (y-x)(1-z)/2 (x-y)z/2  
x-y is negative, 1-z is no more than 1, and (y-x)/2 < y-x, so the first two outcomes both have 
losses under this assignment. x-y < 0 and z > 0, so the third outcome is also a loss. Thus there 
are stakes at which in every relevant possible world the subject loses. An analogous argument 
can be made for y < x, z > 0. 
How does an argument style that did not work to defend ST, work to defend something that 
implies it? We saw that what undermined the sure loss arguments concerning the 
unconditional probabilities, P(H) = x and P(P(H)=x) = 1 was that the non-actual worlds in which 
P(H) did not equal x – and the subject who was uncertain that it was x might win – exist and 
had to be counted among the relevant possible worlds if the subject’s having a particular 
degree of belief was to be treated as a random variable. The conditional bet by its structure 
(apparently) removes those worlds from the set of relevant possibilities. The possible worlds in 
which the subject who has odds on H that are not equal to x could win or break even, also 
happen to be worlds in which the conditional bet is called off. 
Neat as this is, the previous table is misleading in listing the bet on H at odds x:1-x on a par 
with the other bets, for while the odds implied by our assumptions: 
P(H/P(H)=x) = y for some y > x,  
P(P(H)=x) = z > 0, 
describe actual dispositions of the subject, neither of these assumptions nor their conjunction 
determines an actual value for P(H). Nothing in our assumptions allows us to say more about 
the odds x:1-x than that it is possible that the subject has them. Thus, their difference in status 
from the odds listed in the left column needs to be flagged more prominently.  
In addition, though the subject does not have a commitment to odds of x on H in the worlds of 
the third and fourth columns, she does have some commitment or other about H in each of 
those worlds; we will call those odds u:1-u. Finally, the subject also has some value or other for 
P(H/P(H)≠x) in every possible world, and that must be registered in the table to see the full 
picture. It is a disposition with regard to the complementary conditional bet to the one in our 
original assumptions, the probability of H on the catch-all, that is, on the assumption that P(H) 
is something other than x. We can see via total probability that lack of a value for this term is 
why our two assumptions do not determine an actual value for P(H): 
P(H) = P(H/P(H)=x)P(P(H)=x) + P(H/P(H)≠ x)P(P(H)≠ x) 
If we assume SR, then P(H/P(H)=x) = x for all x, and that determines the value of P(H/P(H)=u) 
for all u not equal to a specified x; the value is u. However, we were supposed to be arguing for 
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SR, not assuming it. Our assumption that P(H/P(H)=x) = y > x does not determine the value of 
P(H/P(H)≠x) – other things equal, likelihoods are independent of each other – so we will record 
this catch-all likelihood explicitly in the table in order to make plain that as far as we know it 
can take any value. The odds corresponding to this conditional probability we represent in 
general as v:1-v.  
With these implicit terms spelled out, the table for a subject adhering to SR looks as follows.  
Outcomes ---> H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x H and P(H)= u ≠ x -H and P(H)=u ≠ x 
            b3(1-x)             -b3x          b3(1–u), etc.       -b3u, etc. 
 Actual odds ↓     
(1-G(ω))b4(H(ω) 
– u) 
0 0 b4(1–u) -b4u 
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – 
x) 
b1(1-x) -b1x 0 0 
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1-z) b2(1-z) - b2z - b2z 
Total each 
outcome 
(b3+ b1)(1-x)+ 
b2(1-z) 
-(b3 +b1)x + 
b2(1-z) 
(b3+ b4)(1–u) – 
b2z  
-(b3+ b4)u – b2z 
Because this subject is following SR, the variable v in the first-row, third-column outcome 
world has become u. In none of the worlds indicated by the columns does the subject have 
more than one set of odds on H, or anything else, so no coefficients will lead to loss in all of the 
possible worlds represented. 
However SR does not protect us from all trouble. The following conditions are compatible with 
those that were used to define the SR table: 
1. P(H) = x 
2. P(P(H) = x)) = 1 
3. P(PR(H/P(H) = x) = y) = 1, y ≠ x, and  
4. P(P(H) = x)) = 1 ⇒ P(PR(P(H) = x) = 1) =1  
where “PR” designates an objective probability function. Under these conditions the outcomes 
row showing the properties defining each possible world would have four more columns, and 
most saliently here, in half of those columns where it now has “P(H) = x”, it would also have 
“PR(H) = y”. If so, then for the subject with G(ω)b1(H(ω) – x) = b1(1-x), that is, for whom 
P(H/P(H) = x) = x, there exist possible worlds in which she is willing to bet on H at odds x:1-x 
despite the fact, in that world, that the objective probability of H is y. It is no irrationality to 
have one’s degree of belief fail to match the objective probability – that is mere ignorance – 
but this particular failure is one the subject could have avoided because 1-4 imply that she is 
also certain that the objective probability of H is y. I will call this situation awkward. 
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We will avoid awkward questions in the current context by imposing a proviso that will remove 
such cases from the scope of the principle, thus: 
P(H/P(H)=x) = x  provided no statement or set of statements of probability (other than 
P(H) = x) for which P has a value is (possibly together with P(H) = x) 
probabilistically relevant to H.19,20 
Call this “Restricted Self-Respect” (RSR). (Cf. Roush 2009, 253) A subject following this principle 
is safe from book since SR is safe and this is SR over a restricted domain. It tells her to follow 
the 10th character when there are no relevant probability statements that she has values for 
that could imply that the properties of the outcome-worlds are different from or in tension 
with what the condition P(H) = x in the conditional probability P(H/P(H) = x) designates them to 
be.21 Analogously to SR, RSR implies a version of the Accuracy property – Accuracy qualified by 
the proviso – so the shift to RSR does not undermine but only qualifies the Indirect Argument.  
However this does not imply that following SR or RSR is the only way to avoid incoherence. The 
more explicit table allows us to see that there is another safe way for a subject to accept a 
value for P(H/P(H) = x). Imagine that she has a policy of regarding the mere claim that she has a 
particular degree of belief in H as irrelevant to whether H is true. Thus, whichever possible 
world she might be in, and for all x, her disposition toward P(H/P(H)=x) is just the same as her 
disposition toward H, whatever the disposition toward H is in that world. She would be 
following a strategy of regarding a mere statement about what her belief in H is as irrelevant to 
what her belief in H should be.22 This is expressed by the following alternative principle to RSR: 
                                                             
19 Note that this refers to probability statements, such as “P(H) = x” or “PR(H/P(H) = x)” that themselves have 
probability values. The function P also assigns values to statements such as H, but those first-order statements 
need not be disqualified by the proviso. The probabilities for all first-order propositions relevant to H should be 
taken into account in the value we give to P(H/P(H)), just as the probabilities for all same-order propositions 
relevant to A should be taken into account when evaluating P(A/B). 
20 Note that the paradoxical type of proposition treated by Caie 2013, where H is equivalent to P(H) ≥ .5, is ruled 
out by this proviso, since the equivalence makes P(H) ≥ .5 relevant to H, and the subject has a value for P(P(H) ≥ 
.5). 
21 The counterexamples to SR given in Skyrms (1980), Christensen (2007, 2010), Roush (2009), and Lasonen-
Aarnio (2015) all appeal to suppositions relevant to the relation of the subject’s beliefs to the world – optimism, 
drug consumption, empirical psychological evidence of unreliability, angel communications. They can be 
represented in the form of conditions 1-4 because those suppositions must be matters the subject has degrees of 
belief in if she is to be expected to take them into account. They are thus not counterexamples to RSR. A principle 
that handles such cases coherently without awkwardness when P(H) = x and PR(H/P(H) = x) = y are in the 
condition of the conditional probability is Cal: P(q/(P(q) = x and PR(q/P(q)=x)=y)) = y. (Roush 2009) A principle that 
handles the cases where 1-4 are in the background is: RSR when the proviso is fulfilled and P(q/P(q)=x) = y when 
conditions 1-4 are in the background, and are the only relevant statements of probability in the background. 
Analogous principles can be formulated for NGI below. These points can be seen by recognizing that what I call 
awkwardness here is a violation of the Principal Principle. See Roush 2009, 252-7. 
22 Note that there would be no more psychological difficulty in following this principle than there would for RSR 
since it substitutes for the ability to count ten characters the equally basic ability to recognize the syntactic 
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P(H/P(H)=x) = P(H) provided no statement or set of statements of probability (other than 
P(H) = x) for which P has a value is (possibly together with P(H) = x) 
probabilistically relevant to H.   
Call this “No Gratuitous Interference” (NGI), and the same principle without the proviso “No 
Interference” (NI). RSR, analogously to SR, can be justified by saying that merely being 
confident that I have a given degree of belief in H is not a reason to have a different degree of 
belief in H. NGI follows the thought that merely being confident that I have a given degree of 
belief in H is also not by itself a reason to have that degree of belief in H. If I am a 
(probabilistically) rational subject then I have (probabilistic) reasons for whatever degree of 
belief I do have in H, but that I have that degree of belief in H is not all by itself a reason, at 
least not in general. As above with RSR, the proviso captures the intuitive idea that the 
principle applies only when the claim that the subject has a given degree of belief alone is 
under consideration. NGI, like RSR, is not awkward, but a subject following NI can be awkward 
for the same reason that one following SR can be: statements of probability can in conjunction 
with other statements of probability be probabilistically relevant to the properties of the 
relevant outcome worlds. 
That a subject following NGI is not vulnerable to sure loss can be seen by writing out the table 
for the answers she gives: 
Outcomes ---> H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x H and P(H)= u ≠ x -H and P(H)=u ≠ x 
   “b3(H(ω) – x)” 
        b3(1-x) 
  “b3(H(ω) – x)”   
          -b3x 
   “b3(H(ω) –u)” 
       b3(1 – u) 
   “b3(H(ω) – u)” 
           -b3u 
 Actual odds ↓     
(1-G(ω))b4(H(ω) 
– P(H)) 
0 0 b4(1–P(H)) -b4P(H) 
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – 
P(H)) 
b1(1-P(H)) -b1P(H) 0 0 
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1-z) b2(1-z) - b2z - b2z 
Total each 
outcome 
b3(1-x)+ b1(1-x)+ 
b2(1-z) 
-b3x+ -b1x+ 
b2(1-z) 
(b3+ b4)(1–u) – 
b2z  
-(b3 +b4)u – b2z 
There is no world in which the subject has more than one set of odds on H, but here it is not 
because the subject’s value for P(H/P(H)=x) is always whatever the 10th character in that 
expression is, but because the subject’s value for that expression is always whatever her value 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
difference between “H” and “P(H)=x” or the verbal difference between “H” and “I believe that H”. Both RSR and 
NGI would also require the subject who applies them to recognize whether the proviso is fulfilled, but while that 
cannot be guaranteed, the matter will often not be mysterious. It is a question of whether you have degrees of 
beliefs about whether or not something is interfering with your belief’s relationship to the truth. 
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for P(H) happens to be. In the worlds of the first two outcome columns that is x. In the worlds 
of the third and fourth outcome columns that is u.  
The reason the 10th-Character Principle works for those subjects for whom it does preserve 
coherence – the Accurate subjects – is that these subjects never discharge the condition 
P(H)=x, i.e., become certain that P(H)=x,  unless P(H) does equal x. RSR is thus a special case of 
NGI.23 Following the 10th-Character Principle will make anyone who does not actually have 
accurate beliefs about her beliefs vulnerable to sure loss, but the imperfect subject can avoid 
this entirely, regardless of the degree of her ignorance about her belief state, by following NGI. 
Any subject can avoid sure loss by following NGI, but, unlike SR and RSR, NGI does not imply 
any version of the Accuracy property. Thus the Indirect Argument for Accuracy fails. 
Since NGI imposes an irrelevance between the first- and second-orders it may seem like a new 
way of making second-order probabilities idle, to put alongside the way that ST appears to do 
so by making their values extreme, and so probabilistically irrelevant to all other propositions. 
Also, probabilistic irrelevance is the same thing as independence, and if I have any epistemic 
competence at all then my believing p is not independent of whether p is true or not; why 
should I treat myself so disrespectfully by following NGI? Both of these worries are addressed 
by the proviso. NGI only applies to the subject’s responses to statements of her degrees of 
belief when taken by themselves, and if as per the proviso there are no probability statements 
she has beliefs about (probabilities for) except the bare statement that she has degree of belief 
x in H, then she does not attribute to her beliefs any relation to the world, incompetent or 
competent. Thus, following NGI does not amount to disrespecting oneself epistemically. NGI 
and RSR are both ways of remaining neutral about oneself. The difference is the way they 
handle the risk of inaccuracy about one’s belief in H. 
On the other hand, when there are probability statements besides P(H) = x that a subject has 
beliefs about, NGI does not apply, and nothing says that conditioning on a statement of your 
degree of belief in that kind of case could not change your degree of belief. The awkward 
                                                             
23 That RSR is a special case of NGI can also be seen by total probability: 
P(H) = P(H/P(H)=x)P(P(H)=x) + P(H/P(H)≠ x)P(P(H)≠ x) 
Following RSR the first term on the right hand side becomes x: 
P(H) = xP(P(H)=x) + P(H/P(H)≠ x)P(P(H)≠ x) 
If P(P(H)=x) = 1, that is, the subject is certain that she has degree of belief x, then 
P(H) = x(1) + P(H/P(H)≠ x)(0) 
So it must also be the case that 
P(H) = x 
That is, she must fulfill Accuracy. However, that leaves several terms in the equation unused. If the subject follows 
NGI, then P(H/P(H)=x) = P(H) for all x, so the initial total probability equation above becomes: 
 P(H) = P(H)P(P(H)=x) + P(H)P(P(H)≠ x) 
The subject following NGI may have Accuracy or not without any sure-loss vulnerability, provided her confidence 
that she does not have degree of belief x equals 1 minus her confidence that she does: 
P(H) = P(H)c + P(H)(1-c) 
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situation described above is a class of cases in which the further assumptions 1-4 make the 
statement of what the subject’s degree of belief is relevant to the probability of H. Principles 
for handling such cases have values other than x on the right-hand side, and so can underwrite 
changes in first-order degrees of belief on the basis of beliefs about one’s beliefs by 
conditionalization, and this is so even if one has an extreme degree of belief about P(H) = x. 
(Roush 2009) Thus NGI does not force second-order probabilities to be inert. 
One will notice that granting failures of ST as rational allows it to be rational for someone to 
assert Moorean sentences (both ommissive and commissive) that is, to both be confident that 
p and confident that she is not confident of p or confident that p and not confident that she is 
confident. This does not imply that the Moorean false step is not a violation of rationality, but 
only that probabilistic coherence does not tell us what is wrong about it. This should not 
surprise us since coherence is a generalization of deductive consistency, and most of us do not 
think that deductive consistency tells us what is wrong with Moorean sentences either.  
4. The Broader Context: the value of uncertainty about one’s beliefs 
The Direct Argument for Self-Transparency failed because of the relevance of possible worlds 
in which the subject wins her second-order bet by having in those worlds different first-order 
degrees of belief from those she actually has. But the subject does not actually have those 
degrees of belief, and her having them is only subjectively possible, possible for all she knows. 
How could they really matter? They can matter in ways that make uncertainty about one’s 
beliefs not only rationally permissible but advantageous. 
They can matter for a combination of reasons. First, that one possesses a degree of belief in q 
is a state of the world. Like any state of the world it can have a utility, positive or negative, and 
that utility can be independent of the truth value of q. For example it is often of positive utility 
to believe that one’s spouse or partner is faithful, whether he or she is or not. Relationships 
can be easier and more rewarding if the parties are not suspicious of each other. For another 
example, it could be of positive utility for an advertiser for RJ Reynolds to believe that smoking 
does not cause cancer, since it might help him sleep better at night.  
Second, the bet a subject makes on her belief in q is not the only bet she makes – often she 
also bets on q, for example – and, as I will illustrate, the utilities of her bets at all orders can be 
weighed together, on the assumption that their units are commensurable. Third, like any 
belief, a belief about one’s own belief can be motivating. In particular, as we will see below, it 
can motivate us to take actions that affect the outcomes of our first-order decisions. Finally, 
though a degree of belief different from your actual one is merely possible for all you know, 
this epistemic possibility matters to your decisions since you cannot base your decisions on 
reality itself but only on what you believe about reality. The coin may have already come up 
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heads, but if you have not seen the coin or been told how it landed, then the possibility that it 
is tails should play a role in any of your decisions that depend on that outcome. 
The case of implicit bias illustrates these points nicely. Suppose the proposition in question at 
the first order is that women are by that fact less competent, call this H. We can imagine 
betting on whether or not one’s degree of belief in H is 0 (one lacks bias) or greater than 0 (one 
has bias).24, 25 What are the stakes on the bet whether or not one is biased? We may feel 
worse about ourselves if it turns out we have this belief that women are inferior. We may be 
embarrassed and troubled. We may feel okay, maybe even proud, if we do not have this belief. 
The stakes have mainly to do with our self-regard, except to the extent that our having belief in 
H leads others to think we have this belief and they penalize or reward us in consequence. The 
stakes on H itself, whether or not women are by that fact less competent, may be much higher. 
H is probabilistically relevant to whether Ms. Y or Mr. X is more competent, and my degrees of 
belief about that will affect my vote on which of them gets a job offer. The stakes for me on 
which candidate is more competent can be high. A more competent colleague will contribute 
more to my organization, and so to my job satisfaction, and I might care intrinsically about 
hiring the most qualified person because I care about fairness.  
This is a case where beliefs about our beliefs can motivate us to act, or not. For example, one 
could imagine that if one were uncertain whether one had some disposition toward H one 
might take measures, such as blinding of applications, to prevent a possible such inclination 
from affecting a hiring decision. And suppose that if one were certain that P(H) = 0, that is, 
certain that one were unbiased, then one would not take mitigating measures. After all, one 
would be certain that there was no reason to do so. 
We can see in the following table how things would turn out for a subject with these options. 
 
Second-order options   
First-order options ↓ 
P(P(H) = 0) = 1 P(P(H) = 0) < 1 
P(H) = 0 (3, 1) (2, -1) 
                                                             
24 Having or lacking bias would be more fully represented as gender being probabilistically relevant to one’s 
judgments of the competence of individuals rather than as a categorical proposition, but self-knowledge or 
ignorance of that relevance would be more complicated to represent and unnecessary for the current point. I 
assume that belief in H leads to gender being probabilistically relevant to one’s judgments of competence, and 
non-belief not. 
25 Of course, in implicit bias cases there may in addition be flat preferences for, say, men over women that do 
their work in decision-making independently of beliefs about competence. These could be added into the picture. 
However, to represent implicit bias as involving only a flat preference and no (biased) belief about competence is 
not as charitable as I have been since on my picture we allow that the person is making a choice of candidates on 
the basis of a judgment about competence – however skewed or unknown to her – rather than only on a gut 
preference. 
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P(H) > 0 (-2, -1) (2, 1) 
 
The table has two dimensions of “choice”26 and every choice and pay-off belongs to you. Your 
options at the first order are your beliefs about women, and are listed in the leftmost column. 
You are either unbiased, as in the first row of outcomes, or biased, as in the second row. Your 
options at the second order are listed in the top row. They are to be certain that you are 
unbiased, as in the first column of outcomes, or uncertain that you are unbiased, as in the 
second column of outcomes.  
For the payoffs, the numbers are arbitrary except for the relations of greater and less. In the 
first position in the ordered pair we have the payoff from the first-order options, the option 
you take between the two rows, and in the second position of the ordered pair we have the 
payoff at the second order, from the option you take between columns, whether to be certain 
or uncertain that you are unbiased. The stakes on the second-order bet, 1 and -1, are taken 
here to be lower than those on the first-order bet, 3 and -2. For one who cares more about 
self-regard and the regard and reaction of others to one’s beliefs than about hiring the most 
competent person, that relation would be reversed. 
In figuring out the payoffs, we are assuming that H is false – otherwise the belief would not be 
a bias. The truth value of H affects your pay-offs because having a bias will make it more likely 
you vote for a less competent job candidate than you might have. In the upper left outcome 
you are unbiased, so you do as well as you could have at choosing the most competent 
candidate, +3, and you were certain that you were unbiased so you win as much as you could 
have on the second order bet, +1; this is a win-win. Below that we have the outcome where 
you are biased, so you lose some in your judgment of the competence of job candidates, -2, 
and you are biased but certain that you are not, so you lose there too, -1: lose-lose.  
In the right column where you are uncertain about your belief, that uncertainty about whether 
you are biased made you take mitigation measures. Suppose for simplicity that those measures 
were perfectly effective, so whether you are actually biased or not you do as well as you could 
have at the first-order, in those judgments of candidates. However those positive payoffs are 
smaller than the one on the left, +2 rather than +3, because mitigation measures are not free, 
and that reduces your payoff from successfully choosing the most competent candidate. In the 
second-order bet the subject uncertain of whether she is biased loses something in case she is 
not biased, so she gets a -1 in the second position in the upper right block. But, in the lower 
right block the subject uncertain that she’s unbiased wins 1 because indeed she is biased; this 
is a win-win.  
                                                             
26 Despite the language of choice we need not assume that a subject has voluntary control over her belief states in 
order to make use of these tables. They only compare the values or advantages of various combinations of states 
and make no commitment about how you get or got to them. 
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The subject on the left, who is certain she is unbiased, wins more than in any other possible 
outcome if she’s right that she lacks bias. However, she loses more than in any other outcome 
if she is wrong about that. If the subject on the right is unbiased then she wins less than she 
could have because of the cost of mitigation measures and of being wrong about her belief, 
but if she is biased then she still has a win-win. Thus for a person concerned to avoid the 
worst-case scenario it is better to be uncertain about her belief, as long as the first-order 
stakes are higher than the second, with the proviso that if mitigation measures are costly 
enough the advantage of uncertainty could be outweighed. The table looks different if H is 
true27, but the point here is that it can be advantageous to be uncertain what one’s degree of 
belief is, not that it is always advantageous. 
Being uncertain of your degree of belief is a violation of the Confidence direction of Self-
Transparency, and we have found not only, above, that there is no good argument in sight that 
lack of Confidence brings incoherence, but also, just now, that lack of Confidence can be 
advantageous. There may not be situations where lack of Accuracy is advantageous, but many 
of us do have inaccuracies and the fact, argued earlier, that lack of Accuracy about our beliefs 
does not necessarily bring incoherence, means that as long as we follow NGI we can mobilize 
the framework of probabilistic decision theory for guidance on how to manage the hidden 
corners of our minds, in the way that I have illustrated here for failures of Confidence. It is not 
probabilistically irrational to be ignorant about what lies hidden in us, but since this fact makes 
available the probabilistic framework for handling the uncertainty it would be irrational not to 
use it. 
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